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CRIMINAL LAW-BURDEN OF PROOF IN
INSANITY DEFENSE
Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964)
The defendant was tried, without a jury, on several charges
involving statutory rape and assaults of female children. His
sole defense was that he was insane at the time the offenses were
committed. After introduction of sharply conflicting medical
testimony, the trial judge ruled that the defendant was sane at
the time of the .offenses and on the date of the trial, but in his
review of the evidence, he did not indicate whether his decision
was based on the defendant's failure to prove his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence or on the prosecution's proof of
his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. HELD: Remanded. Since
it was the first time the question was squarely presented in
Maryland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland elected to remand
the case for further proceedings as necessary to indicate which
theory had been applied by the trial judge. The majority held
that the presumption of sanity, as a legal presumption, pre-
vailed only until overcome by a sufficient proof of insanity at
the trial. At that time, since insanity involves intent which is
an essential element of the offense, the burden of proof shifted
to the State to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. Two justices dissented primarily in the belief that the
defendant should bear the risk of persuasion, and that to acquit
simply because doubt is raised to his sanity is to relax the funda-
mental concept of criminal justice, wherein the matter of the
accused's sanity never attaches to the prosecution. Bradford v.
State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964).
The prevailing rule in all jurisdictions is that the accused is
presumed sane until contrary evidence is introduced.1 This pre-
sumption is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case in favor
of the State, and until such contrary evidence is entered the State
is not required to introduce evidence in chief to prove the sanity
of the accused.2 The initial burden of producing evidence to
the judge thus falls on the defendant.3 It is important to dis-
tinguish this element of the burden of proof from that of the risk
1. For a list of cases in all jurisdictions see WFiHOFEN, MENTAL DIsoDER
As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954).
2. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd cir. 1961) ; Walters v. State,
183 Ind. 178, 108 N.E. 583 (1915); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 898
(11th ed. 1955).
3. 9 WIxuoaE, EVIDENCE § 2487 (3rd ed. 1940).
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of non-persuasion of the jury.4 The former is discharged when
either side introduces sufficient evidence of irresponsibility to
create a jury question.5
It is either held that the presumption of sanity remains an
issue and should be considered by the jury along with other
evidence on the question, or that it is not evidence and cannot
be treated as such, in other words, that the presumption has
fully served its purpose once evidence has been introduced, and
disappears.
7
The courts are almost evenly divided as to the latter burden,
that of the burden of persuasion. The federal government and
approximately half the states place this burden on the prosecu-
tion and require it to prove the sanity of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt. The remainder of the states require the
defendant to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence or some greater measure." The authorities are in rather
hopeless conflict in which no trend is readily apparent.,
Those courts placing the burden of proof on the defendant
argue that sanity is not one of the elements of the crime, but
rather is an essential attribute of humanity. Sanity is a condi-
tion precedent to all intelligent actions. It is a pre-existing fact
which may be taken for granted as implied by law and general
experience. It is further argued that sanity is a quality of the
actor, not an element of the act. Criminal intent, malice, and
premeditation are facts of mental condition and they can only
be proved by inference from material facts and circumstances
as would compel the inference of guilt in a sane person, and this
is the limit of his burden. In other words, the State must prove
all that is set out in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.
The burden of proving the sanity of the accused, however, never
attaches to the State. Here the presumption of sanity, which
is treated as a fact, neutralizes the presumption of innocence.
The defense is treated, in essence, as confession and avoidance,
4. Id. § 2485.
5. Id. § 2487, 2489.
6. UNIFORii RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 14; 2 UNrDERHILL, CRim-IINA EVIDENCE §
453 (5th ed. 1940).
7. MODEL CUDE OF EVIDENCE rule 704 (1942) ; 2 UNDERHILL, op. Cit. supra,
note 6; See discussion of presumptions in 15 Md. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1955).
8. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 241-272; Koller, The Insanity Defense,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 741 (1964).
9. For the view that placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant is
the modern trend see 2 UNDERHILL, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 452; 9 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra, note 3, § 2501; Contra, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (1954);
WEI1HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 238 (1954).
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and since the accused must raise the issue of his lack of capacity
or responsibility by taking the affirmative, it is felt that he
should accordingly bear the burden of proving it.1
These courts seem to rely, to a greater or lesser extent on un-
derlying policy considerations; the chief being a fear that a
reasonable doubt can be too easily created.1 This, it is felt, is
especially true in the light of the imprecise, often conflicting
psychiatric testimony. 12 Perhaps the most frank argument for
this position was that of Attorney General Heiskell to the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Dove v. State:
[T]hat doubt of insanity and doubt of guilt do not stand
on the same footing. Rules of law are not simple matter of
logical consistency. Policy influences them. Every man is
presumed to know the law; to contemplate the consequences
of his acts; malice is presumed from the use of a deadly
weapon, or from the fact of killing; not because courts sup-
pose there [sic] though are universally true in fact, but that
policy demands their adoption. Policy, not logic, is the
foundation of the rule as to drunkenness, that it shall not
excuse crime. The legal reason for it is logically nonsense;
practically wise. The same policy demands that we adhere
to the English rule as to proof of insanity, not make a new
one as other states have done.' 3
The federal government and those states placing the burden
of proof on the State contend that the fundamental proposition
of the criminal law calling upon the State to prove the defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt extends logically to the
area of criminal responsibility. They argue that the basic
elements of the crime are, first, the act and second, the intent
or mens rea. In order to prove the crime it is essential to show
that the defendant was capable of entertaining the requisite
mens rea. Intention is proved by the circumstances connected
with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and
descretion of the accused. The act alone, even under the most
aggravating circumstances, will not suffice, absent sanity.
10. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964) (dissenting opinion);
State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574 (1870) ; State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 AtI.
905 (1904) ; LINDZfAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
351 (1961) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
11. State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W.2d 596 (1951); Holober v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 826, 62 S.E.2d 816 (1951).
12. Ortwcin v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414 (1874).
13. 3 Heisk. 348, 353 (Tenn. 1874).
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Sanity then, is an ingredient in crime, as much as the overt act.
14
The presumption of sanity considered here is but a bare legal
presumption and when a doubt is raised on the question of
sanity that presumption disappears.'5 It is further argued; that
to allow the presumption of sanity to bind the jury until the
defendant proves that he is not guilty by reason of insanity is, in
effect, to force him to establish his innocence by proving that
he was not guilty of the crime charged.10
One of the strongest arguments rejecting policy considerations
is that of the Tennessee court in the Dove case:
The force of this argument is much strengthened by the
facts proven as to the violent character of this defendant.
To turn him loose might be to subject some other innocent
victim to the same fate with [the deceased]. But this is
not the tribunal to which the consideration of public policy
can be appropriately addressed. Our business is to adminis-
ter the law and not to make the law. We find the law well
settled that where the State charges a citizen with crime,
his guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
We apply this rule to the worst men about whose sanity no
doubt is raised, then turn them loose to repeat their crimes,
because they are entitled to the humane doctorine of doubts.
With what show of reason or humanity could we reverse the
rule as to that unfortunate class of citizens whose memory
and discretion is found to be of doubtful soundness and
subject them to imprisonment .... 17
South Carolina seems to be in the camp of those states requir-
ing the defendant to establish his sanity by a preponderance of
the evidence.' 8 This rule is, however, coupled with the caveat
that if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of his legal guilt,
they must acquit. 19 Thus it would seem that the court has
adopted a double standard.
14. United States v. Davis, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Hobbs v. People, 31 Ill.
385 (1863) ; GLUECK, MENTAL DisoRDER AND THE CaimNAL LAW 41 (1925);
LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra, note 10.
15. Hobbs v. People, supra, note 14.
16. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 792 (1952) (dissenting opinion); United
States v. Davis, supra, note 14.
17. Dove v. State, supra, note 13.
18. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439 (1885) ; State v. Young, 238 S.C. 115, 119
S.E.2d 504 (1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Hann, 196 S.C.
211, 12 S.E.2d 720 (1940) ; State v. Hyde, 90 S.C. 296, 73 S.E. 180 (1911) ;
State v. Paulk, 18 S.C. 514 (1883) ; State v. Stark, 1 Strob. 479 (S.C. 1847).
19. State v. Deschamps, 134 S.C. 179, 131 S.E. 420 (1925) (concurring
opinion) ; See State v. McIntosh, 39 S.C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1892) where it was
considered fatal error for the judge to refuse to instruct the jury:
1961:]
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Prior to 1926 the defense of alibi was considered to be an
affirmative defense that must be established by the greater
weight of the evidence, but the jury was required to acquit
the defendant if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to whether
he had proved the defense.20 This view was overruled in
tate v. McGee where the court reasoned that the above two
tests were inconsistent and calculated to confuse the jury; that
the one true test should be to require the State to prove the de-
fendant's presence beyond a reasonable doubt.21 These decisions
could perhaps be made the basis for a future argument to the
court as to the insanity defense :22 first; in that there is an in-
consistency in the one rule for the defense of insanity and the
other for that of alibi, since it would seem that insanity bears a
similar relationship to the mens rea as alibi to the crime itself;
second, in that the two tests in the defense of insanity are in-
herently inconsistent and thus calculated to confuse the jury.
The better logic is clearly opposed to making the accused prove
his insanity. It would appear extremely difficult to uphold
the premise, requiring the State in criminal cases to prove only
such facts and circumstances as would infer guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt in a "sane" man, without regard to the par-
ticular accused then on trial. In addition, the policy argument
has lost much of its effect in recent years, as insanity has come
to be recognized as a disease that can be treated as such. Modern
statutes provide for the incarceration, in many cases, of those
acquitted because of doubtful sanity. But, in any event it seems
contrary to our conception of criminal justice to convict a de-
fendant if there is any reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the
crime alleged.
JOHN J. McKAY
While it is true that the defendant is required to prove that he was of
unsound mind at the time of the homicide, by the preponderance of the
evidence, it is also true that upon the consideration of the whole case, the
State's as well as the defendant's, if any reasonable doubt remains in the
mind of the jury, the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
20. State v. West, 138 S.C. 421, 136 S.E. 736 (1927).
21. 137 S.C. 256, 135 S.E. 59 (1926).
22. But cf. State v. Deschamps, mipra, note 19.
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